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Abstract— Since 2006, several varieties of transgenic 
Bt-maize  are  approved  for  commercial  cultivation  in 
Germany.  The  German  regulatory  framework  for 
growing  these  crops  comprises  ex-ante  regulations  as 
well as ex-post liability rules to protect conventional and 
organic  farming  from  possible  negative  side  effects  of 
transgenic  plants  and  to  ensure  co-existence.  Public 
regulation is also suspected to impose additional costs to 
those farmers who intend to plant Bt-maize. We address 
the question how Bt-maize growing farmers perceive the 
additional costs of regulation and whether coordination 
or  cooperation  takes  place  in  order  to  diminish  these 
costs.  In  2006,  we  carried  out  a  case  study  in  the 
Oderbruch region (Brandenburg, Germany) comprising 
eight  Bt-maize  growing  farmers  and  six  adjacent 
neighbours. The predominantly large farms chose intra-
farm coordination to manage the construction of buffer 
zones within their own fields and to avoid the planting of 
Bt-maize  close  to  their  neighbours.  Inter-farm 
coordination or cooperation with adjacent farmers was 
not regarded necessary to achieve co-existence.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Regulations concerning the cultivation of GM crops 
are embedded in the German Genetic Engineering Act 
(GenTG)  [1]  which  dates  back  to  1990.  The  first 
partial amendment of the GenTG in 2004 included the 
establishment of a public site register (§16a, GenTG) 
and the compliance with Good Agricultural Practice 
(GAP) (§16b, GenTG) as forms of ex-ante regulation. 
Furthermore,  ex-post  liability  rules  were  defined  in 
§36a, GenTG. Further amendment is currently under 
way. 
The public site register is provided by the Federal 
Office  of  Consumer  Protection  and  Food  Safety 
(BVL) and gives detailed information on the planting 
of  GM  crops  in  order  to  monitor  possible 
environmental and health effects [2]. It is divided into 
a public part, which is freely accessible via the internet 
and  displays  information on  the exact  field  location 
and  the  type  of  crop  grown,  and  a  non-public  part 
which  comprises  personal  data  of  the  GM-planting 
farmer. For reasons of data privacy, information from 
this  part  is  only  given  upon  request  and  only  to 
neighbouring farmers or other persons with legitimate 
interests. Cultivation of GM crops must be registered 
90 days in advance to planting (§16a GenTG). 
Another element is the compliance with the general 
code  of  GAP  (§16b  GenTG).  The  GM  farmer  is 
obliged  to  meet  general  safety  arrangements,  for 
instance  minimum  distances  to  neighbouring  fields, 
the  use  of  different  varieties,  or  pollen  barriers  to 
prevent damage to third parties. However, the GenTG 
lacks  concrete  specification  of  minimum  distance 
requirements  that  are  sufficient  to  keep  outcrossing 
below  the  EU-wide  labelling  threshold  of  0.9%  for 
adventitious  and  technical  inevitable  GM  traces  in 
food and feed. In 2006, German GM farmers had to 
rely  on  recommendations  from  GM  seed  companies 
which  recommended  buffer  zones  of  20 m  to  keep 
outcrossing below the labelling threshold [3]. 
In the case of ex-post liability, Bt-maize growing 
farmers in a region are jointly and severally liable for 
damages  caused  by,  e.g.,  cross-pollination 
(§32 GenTG).  Furthermore,  GM  farmers  are  strictly 
liable, i.e., even if they have met all requirements of 
the GAP, they are not exempt from third party liability 
claims. 
From  the  legal  framework  of  ex-ante  regulations 
and ex-post liability additional costs can arise to the 
farmer who decides to grow GM crops: 
1)  Administration and publication costs  
The cultivation of Bt-maize must be announced in 
the national public site register of the BVL. This can 
cause direct costs such as the act of registration itself 
as  well as indirect costs for  instance  related  to  free   2 
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data availability through the internet which already led 
to a number of GM-field destructions.  
2)  Damage prevention and co-existence measure 
costs 
In  order  to  avoid  possible  damage,  e.g.,  through 
gene  outcrossing,  the  farmer  is  obliged  to  meet  the 
standards of GAP. Apart from direct additional costs 
arising from the establishment of isolation distances or 
buffer  zones  also  indirect  costs  must  be  taken  into 
consideration like the search for suitable co-existence 
measures which were not specified in the German law. 
3)  Damage and liability costs 
Even if a farmer meets the requirements of the code 
of GAP s/he is still jointly and severally as well as 
strictly liable for possible damages. The damage and 
liability costs depend on a) the expected damage, b) 
the  probability  of  damage  occurrence,  and  c)  the 
probability that the farmer is actually held liable for 
the  damage.  Apart  from  theses  direct  costs,  also 
possible costs arising from lawsuits have to be taken 
into consideration [4]. 
II. FORMS OF COORDINATION AND 
COOPERATION 
According to the legal framework in Germany the 
GM-farmer  carries  the  burden  of  ensuring  co-
existence  exclusively.  However,  we  argue  that  both 
the  GM-farmer  and  his  non-GM  neighbours  could 
contribute  to  co-existence  by  coordination  or 
cooperation.  Coordination  can  take  place  within  a 
single  farm  (intra-farm  coordination)  or  among  two 
adjacent farmers (inter-farm coordination). For intra-
farm coordination, a GM-farmer can arrange his own 
fields to keep maximum distances to his neighbours, 
adjust field size to reduce the risk of outcrossing or 
keep  isolation  distances.  Inter-farm  coordination 
involves  the  GM-farmer  as  well  as  the  non-GM 
neighbour. The GM-farmer can inform his neighbour 
on  his  intention  to  grow  GM-maize  and  the  exact 
location of the GM-field. Both farmers can agree on 
planting  different  varieties  or  adjusting  their 
cultivation  plans  in  order  to  prevent  short  distances 
between GM- and non-GM maize fields. 
Cooperation itself can be defined as a special form 
of  inter-farm  coordination.  Beckmann  and  Schleyer 
(2007)  [5]  observe  three  new  forms  agricultural 
cooperation as a result of the approval of transgenic 
varieties for commercial cultivation in the EU: (1) the 
development  of  so-called  GMO  free  zones,  (2)  the 
creation  of  potential  GMO-zones  or  (3)  cooperation 
for co-existence.  
In the case of cooperation for co-existence, adjacent 
farmers  can  cooperate  for  co-existence  by  changing 
fields to keep safe distances. 
In a region with GM farms as well as conventional 
or  organic  farms  co-existence  can  cause  additional 
costs.  We  argue  that  cooperation  between 
neighbouring farmers becomes the more beneficial the 
higher the costs of on-farm co-existence measures are 
perceived  and  whether  cooperation  can  reduce  the 
costs  of  ex-ante  regulation  and  ex-post  liability 
significantly. One still has to keep in mind that also 
coordination  and  cooperation  themselves  are  a  new 
source of additional costs since agreements have to be 
made, monitored, and enforced. 
III. CASE STUDY 
As the case study region we chose the Oderbruch 
Region in the eastern part of the German federal state 
of Brandenburg because in this area infestation rates 
with  the  European  Corn  Borer  (Ostrinia  nubilalis 
HÜBNER) are high [6] and Bt-maize has already been 
adopted  by  several  farmers  to  control  the  pest.  In 
2006, we carried out a full-sample case study in the 
Brandenburg  district  of  Märkisch-Oderland  by 
interviewing all eight Bt-maize growing farmers in the 
region  with  a  standardized  questionnaire  comprising 
questions relating to on-farm Bt-maize cultivation, the 
perception of ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability 
as well as to coordination and cooperation. 
IV. RESULTS 
A.  Administration and publication costs due to public 
site register 
In  the  first  place,  a registration in the  public  site 
register is an additional time-consuming activity. At 
least three months in advance, the farmer has to decide 
where  to  plant  Bt-maize  and  the  other  crops.  Once 
registered, he can only plant Bt-maize on the areas he 
initially  intended  for  this  purpose.  The  interview   3 
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results reflect these additional costs since half of the 
Bt-maize growing farmers regarded the registration as 
“cost-intensive”. Registration is also accompanied by 
the  publication  of  farm-related  and  personal  data 
which  can  be  obtained  upon  request.  Seven  out  of 
eight farmers reported personal disadvantages because 
of this publication. Five GM farmers became a direct 
target  of  anti-GM  campaigns,  such  as  field 
destructions and other hostilities. 
B. Damage prevention, co-existence measures and 
their costs 
For the planting seasons 2006 and 2007, the GenTG 
(dated 17
th March 2006) lacked concrete measures for 
co-existence  with  respect  to  GAP  and  only  seed 
companies provided recommendations on co-existence 
management. Every GM farmer kept at least a 20 m 
buffer zone around the Bt-maize stands as suggested 
by Monsanto Agrar Deutschland GmbH. The majority 
of the farmers were even willing to keep buffer zones 
up to 100 m and beyond. Interestingly enough, seven 
out of eight GM farmers linked no or only negligible 
costs to the establishment of buffer zones. Only one 
farmer described the additional costs as high. 
C. Liability rules and risk of damage 
The  ex-post  liability  rules  did  not  have  any 
prominent influence on the farmer’s decision to grow 
Bt-maize.  The  GM farmers  were  able  to  reduce the 
risk of gene outcrossing and, thus, economic damage 
to  their  neighbours  by  spatial  allocation  of  the 
Bt-maize fields. Most of the GM farmers planned to 
expand  Bt-maize  cultivation  in  the  next  years 
regardless of a change of the liability rules. On the 
contrary, three of the six neighbours stated not to have 
grown Bt-maize due to the remaining uncertainty as to 
the liability in case of damage. 
D. Coordination and cooperation between neighbours 
Neighbouring farmers have incentives to coordinate 
if this reduces the costs of co-existence, ranging from 
relatively  easy  intra-farm  coordination  where  no 
external actors are involved to inter-farm coordination 
and  cooperation  where  the  GM-farmer  closely 
interacts  with  his  neighbours  or  even  downstream 
enterprises.  According  to  our  definition,  intra-farm 
coordination  consists  of  three  general  components: 
1) field  allocation,  2)  field  size  and  3)  isolation 
distances. Regarding the first two measures the GM 
farmer can decide freely on whether to adopt them or 
not whereas the last option is already prescribed by 
German law even if legally defined safety distances 
are still lacking. In our case study we observed that all 
farmers willingly kept distance requirements mainly in 
the form of buffer zones. In some cases, farmers also 
made  use  of  field  allocation  to  ensure  even  wider 
safety distances to organically farming neighbours. 
Inter-farm coordination always directly involves the 
adjacent farmers. We define four components of inter-
farm  coordination:  1)  information  of  neighbours, 
2) adjustment of cultivation plans, 3) use of different 
(maize)  varieties  and  finally  4)  cooperation. 
Cooperation itself can be divided into three subgroups 
as suggested by Beckmann and Schleyer (2007) [5]: 
Cooperation  can  take  place  either  in  the  form  of  a 
GMO-free zone, a GMO-zone or cooperation for co-
existence  as  for  instance  the  exchange  of  plots  to 
ensure  safety  requirements.  In  most  cases,  the  GM-
farmer informed at least directly affected neighbours 
about  his  intention  to  plant  Bt-maize  and  about  the 
location of the field. This took place on a semi-official 
basis  since  in  2006  the  GenTG  did  not  require 
notification of neighbours. In our case study we did 
neither observe the adjustment of cultivation plans nor 
the use of different varieties. We argue that inter-farm 
coordination  is  not  generally  necessary  for  the 
adjustment of cultivation plans. In northern Germany, 
maize can not be drilled until late spring because of 
the soil temperature. At that time, winter grain (wheat, 
barley, rye, and rape seed) has already germinated. As 
soon as the GM farmer has to make his registration in 
the cadastre he already notices which crop has been 
sown  next  to  his  Bt-maize  stand.  Thus,  he  can 
coordinate  his  planting  without  contacting  his 
neighbours. The adjustment of varieties seems to be 
only a theoretical solution for co-existence. First of all, 
it is accompanied with additional costs, ranging from 
46 to 201 €/ha according to Messean et al. (2006) [7]. 
In Germany, only five different varieties of MON810 
are approved for commercial cultivation. Two of them 
are medium early varieties (DKC 3421 YG and PR 
39V17) and three are late maturing varieties (Kuratus,   4 
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PR 38F71 and PR 39F56) [8]. From this, we conclude 
that a GM farmer can only vary the flowering time 
within  these  two  groups  since  no  early  maturing 
varieties are yet available on the market. This provides 
little scope for inter-farm coordination. Otherwise, the 
non-GM  neighbour  could  make  use  of  the  different 
varieties of conventional maize and adjust his varieties 
for the sake of co-existence. None of the farmers we 
interviewed seriously took this form of co-existence 
into consideration.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The  results  from  our  case  study  lead  us  to  the 
overall conclusion that under the given circumstances 
in  Brandenburg,  GM-farmers  tend  to  prefer  intra-
farms coordination rather than inter-farm coordination 
or  even  cooperation.  This  is  mainly  due  to  the 
agricultural structure of this region which is dominated 
by  large  farms  with  a  still  low  percentage  of  GM-
maize. These farms can easily guarantee co-existence 
by intra-farm field coordination.  
Still, coordination and cooperation is very likely to 
gain more importance in the future. All GM farmers 
interviewed  planned  to  expand  their  GM-maize 
production  area.  In  the  long  run,  this  probably  will 
render  intra-farm  coordination  more  expensive.  Our 
analysis  was  carried  out  under  the  regulative 
framework of the GenTG from 2006. As stated above, 
the  Act  did  neither  define  specific  distance 
requirements  in  the  course  of  Good  Agricultural 
Practice, nor was there the duty to inform the non-GM 
neighbour nor could a GM farmer and his neighbour 
decide on modifying distance requirements by private 
agreements.  At  the  beginning  of  2008,  the  German 
Genetic Engineering Act was again amended and the 
new act now envisions detailed rules of co-existence 
management for the first time. This includes the duty 
of the GM farmer to inform neighbouring farmers on 
planned  GM  cultivation  and  minimum  distance 
requirements  for  Bt-maize  are  set  at  150  m  to 
conventional farms and 300 m to organic farms. These 
requirements  can  though  be  relaxed  by  private 
agreement which can thus be an incentive for inter-
farm coordination in the future. 
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